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Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Pleas: Understanding the Plea Inquiry

Type of Source
Non-Law Review Journal
Author(s)
Allison D. Redlich & Alicia Summers
Source
18 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 626
Publication Year
2012

Summary

This study explores the requirement that pleas be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Ninety-nine adult defendants participated in the study. Each had just pled guilty to an offense and was presumed to have been competent to enter a plea by the court. Each was asked a series of questions designed to test the voluntariness, knowledge, and intelligence requirements for a plea. As to voluntariness, the study found that during the plea colloquy, the vast majority of study participants had been asked whether their plea was a voluntary decision and answered in the affirmative. When asked the same question by a study interviewer, the vast majority of participants answered in the affirmative. Still, nearly one-third of the participants incorrectly believed that someone other than themselves made the final plea decision.  As to knowledge and intelligence, 100% of the participants were asked during their plea colloquy whether they understood the charges against them. During the study interview, a majority of participants also stated that they understood the plea process, the penalties they faced, and the legal proceedings generally.  However, when asked questions to gauge understanding of these things,  almost two-thirds of the participants were correct on less than 60% of the questions asked. These results suggest that the participants’ comprehension of their plea and its consequences was generally poor.

Key Quote

“Although the present study was not designed to address who is better protected, the results do seem to indicate that a significant proportion of defendants—ones who were considered to be competent (and thus had the ability)—may not fully understand and appreciate the rights they are ceding, the collateral consequences, the voluntariness associated with pleading guilty, and other important safeguards. As we see it, the problem is not so much with the standards set forth (i.e., the American Bar Association standards) but rather is likely to lie in the translation and interpretation of, and fidelity to, the standards.” p. 20