Too Young to Plead? Risk, Rationality, and Plea-Bargaining's Innocence Problem in Adolescents
Summary
Plea bargaining’s “innocence problem”—that innocent defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not commit—is much more persistent among adolescents than adults. Adolescents are more likely than adults to plead guilty because of observable differences in cognitive abilities such as risk-perception, resistance to peer influence, and developmental immaturity. Exploring these phenomena, this study explains and applies fuzzy-trace theory. When they learn new information, individuals process both the overall gist of the information in context and the verbatim details such as exact words and numbers. Consequently, in making decisions, individuals rely upon impressionistic gist-based processing or precise verbatim-based processing. Adults are more likely to use developmentally-advanced gist-based processing. In contrast, adolescents rely much more upon verbatim-based processing, which makes them more likely to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit when the superficial terms of the plea bargain offer are tempting. Because of their cognitive processing style, adolescents are more likely to make plea decisions that do not reflect what is truly important to them. Superficial verbatim-based distinctions have less influence as age increases. The importance of guilt or innocence does not change with age, though values related to guilt or innocence are more easily accessed as individuals grow older and rely more upon gist-based reasoning. These findings should inform potential reforms to adolescent plea-bargaining practices.
Key Quote
“Important differences have been observed in the cognition of adolescents and adults. Differences between adolescents and adults include less future orientation, worse risk perception, and more susceptibility to peer influence in adolescents when compared to adults. Research has also shown neurodevelopmental differences between adolescents and adults that may be responsible for developmentally immature decision making.” p. 181