Pre-Trial Detention and Guilty Pleas: Inducement or Coercion?

This article analyzes the coercive effect of pre-trial detention on the decision to plead guilty through the lens of three levels of inducement: (1) an offer that imposes no limitations and thus may be willingly accepted or rejected; (2) an offer that appears to be a free choice but is actually coerced because refusal places the person in an adverse situation (“soft” coercion); and (3) an offer that is more difficult to refuse than a softly coercive one because the coercion level is even more controlling (“hard” coercion). Interviews of twelve defendants that had been charged with a crime, remanded in custody following their arrest, and eventually pled guilty were conducted. As a result, five of the defendants’ pre-trial detention was considered “hard” coercion, each of them stating that they entered a guilty plea against their will because being released from custody imminently was more favorable than withstanding the long procedural process of proving innocence. Three of the defendants’ pre-trial custody was considered “soft” coercion because, although they would have pleaded guilty regardless of being detained, custody induced them to accept a guilty plea more quickly than they would have if they had been free prior to trial. Lastly, four individuals did not see their pre-trial custody as coercing their decision to plead guilty because they could handle the stress of being detained and were able to competently evaluate the value of the plea deal offered before accepting. The article concludes by encouraging a restructuring of the plea bargaining system, emphasizing that the manner and context in which pre-trial detention is used can coerce defendants to plead guilty when they do not wish or intend to do so.

“While some accused feel that pre-trial detention has no influence on the outcome of their case, others feel that it forced them to plead guilty against their will or that it encouraged them to plead guilty more quickly and thus to accept a less attractive offer.” p. 538