Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel
Summary
The Supreme Court has frequently analyzed criminal defendants’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal justice system where ninety-five percent of convictions follow guilty pleas. Plea negotiation is a critical phase of litigation. Though it has neither examined nor directly established such a constitutional right, the Court implied in three recent decisions that defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to plea negotiations. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court recognized defense attorneys’ affirmative constitutional duty to advise clients about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. In Missouri v. Frye, the Court held that counsel’s failure to communicate a formal plea offer to his client violates his Sixth Amendment duty. Lastly, in Lafler v. Cooper, the Court reasoned that counsel’s deficient plea negotiation may constitute significant prejudice. Opponents of this right to effective bargaining counsel cite two major obstacles. First, plea bargaining is an “art” that occurs off the record and is accordingly difficult to examine should a defendant later claim ineffective assistance. Second, the right would open the floodgates to litigation. In rebuttal, however, proponents claim that the right should not be ignored just because it is difficult to monitor, and most defendants would not abuse the right because they have already received a benefit of the bargain in the form of a reduced sentence.
Key Quote
“The Court has long denied any constitutional right to a plea bargain. However, if negotiations take place, and there is a right to counsel at this critical stage, then it logically follows that there is a right to effective bargaining counsel. . . . [T]his approach means that when the prosecutor opts to bargain, defense counsel has a constitutional duty to meet minimum Sixth Amendment standards.” p. 2664