Defining Coercion: An Application in Interrogation and Plea Negotiation Contexts

Neither the Supreme Court nor literature has established a clear definition of voluntariness or coercion. Confession during interrogations and guilty pleas during plea negotiations must be voluntary to be valid. Though both are forms of admissions from criminal defendants, confessions and guilty pleas are distinct, and one cannot evaluate either properly without a comprehensive definition of the legal requirements to be applied. The author treats voluntariness and coercion as opposite ends of the same continuum. While what constitutes coercion remains relatively unclear and largely subjective, theory and empirical research from law, philosophy, and psychology can inform a more-robust definition. Coercers hold positions of authority over coercees, operate upon their hopes or fears, deprive them of their free will or self-control, and often utilize inducements, threats, or promises. Coercion in an interrogation occurs if the interrogator’s claim is credible to the suspect; the suspect confesses; the suspect would not have confessed but for police intervention; and the suspect does so to lessen the likelihood of harsh punishment or a less-desirable situation. Similarly, coercion in plea negotiations occurs if the prosecutor’s claim is credible to the defendant; the defendant chooses not to go to trial; and the defendant does so to lessen the likelihood of receiving additional charges or a less-desirable situation. Coercion in either setting entails a use of power to constrain the individual’s situation to impose one’s will on that individual via force or conditional proposals.

“By incorporating and building upon legal, philosophical, and psychological perspectives we can begin to develop a more concise and defensible definition of coercion that can be applied in interrogation and plea negotiation settings. . . . [A] proposed definition of coercion would be the use of power to constrain an individual’s situation, to impose one’s will on that individual via the use of force or conditional proposals[.]” p. 245–46